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Four decades ago, the multinational enterprise was widely regarded as a pecu- 
liarly American form of business organization,  a manifestation of the existence 
of a pax Americana. Today, every industrialized country provides a base for a 
considerable number of  multinationals, which collectively are becoming the 
dominant form of  organization responsible for the international exchange of 
goods and services. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s even the larger firms in 
some of the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia and Latin America had 
joined the trend (UN Commission on Transnational Corporations 1990; Lall 
1991). 
For scholars who want to understand the factors affecting international  trade 
in goods and services, these changes are of  consummate importance. In the 
past, whenever the international behavior of multinationals appeared at odds 
with a world regulated by  comparative advantage and capital market theory, 
the deviation could be treated as idiosyncratic,  the basis for a footnote in pass- 
ing. But today, with multinationals dominating the international  traffic in goods 
and services, the question of what determines  their behavior takes on consider- 
able significance. 
I cannot pretend to provide a definitive answer to this central question in the 
pages that follow; that is a labor which will take many minds over an extended 
period of time. But I have two goals in mind which contribute to that central 
task. The first is to persuade the reader that explanations of  the behavior of 
multinational enterprise which draw on the national origins of the enterprise 
as a major explanatory variable are rapidly losing their value, to be replaced 
by  an increased emphasis on the characteristics of  the product markets in 
The author is indebted to Ernest Chung and Suhramanian Rangan for their research support in 
preparing this paper and to Richard Caves and Lawrence H. Wortzel for their incisive comments 
on a earlier draft. 
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which the enterprises participate. The second is to plant a few ideas regarding 
the motivations and responses of  the multinational enterprise that I believe 
must figure in any rounded explanation of the behavior of these enterprises in 
the various product markets they face. 
3.1  U.S. Firms Ascendant 
The sudden growth of U.S.-based multinational networks after World War 
I1 was in fact some time in the making. Many decades earlier, the first signs 
that large enterprises might find themselves pushed to develop a multinational 
structure were already beginning to appear. Setting the stage for the develop- 
ment of these multinational networks were the dramatic improvements in the 
technologies of transportation and communication, coupled with the vastly in- 
creased opportunities for scale economies in industrial production. Operating 
with high fixed costs and low variable costs, a new crop of industrial giants felt 
especially vulnerable to the risks of price competition. And by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, these risks were beginning to be realized; the country’s 
industrial leaders, including firms in machinery, metalworking, and chemicals, 
were coming into bruising contact not only with rivals from the United States 
but also with some from Europe. 
Facing what they perceived to be dangerous and destructive competition, 
the leaders in many U.S. industries went on the defensive. By the beginning of 
the century, many of  the new industries of  the country had organized them- 
selves in restrictive market-sharing arrangements and were reaching out to 
their European competitors to join agreements that were global in scope. 
From the first, however, it was apparent that these restrictive arrangements 
were fragile responses to the threat of competition, especially for firms based 
in the United States (Hexner 1945; Stocking and Watkins  1946; 1948). The 
diversity and scope of the U.S. economy, coupled with a hostile legal environ- 
ment, made it difficult for U.S. leaders to stifle the appearance of new  firms 
inside the country; those same factors put a brake on the leaders’ engaging 
in overt collusion with European rivals. Nevertheless, global market-sharing 
agreements persisted at times, especially when patents and trademarks pro- 
vided a fig leaf for the participants. By and large, though, the role of U.S. firms 
in these restrictive arrangements was cautious and restrained. 
While participating in the international division of markets in a number of 
products before World War 11, many large firms also established the first of 
their subsidiaries in foreign locations during that period. Commonly, however, 
large firms used these subsidiaries to implement their restrictive agreements 
with other firms, as in the case of the Du Pont-ICI  subsidiaries located in Latin 
America. Often, too, firms established such subsidiaries as cautionary moves 
against the possibility that competitors might be in a position to cut them off 
from raw materials in times of shortage or from markets in times of glut. U.S. 
firms that were engaged in extracting and processing raw  materials, for in- 59  Where Are the Multinationals Headed? 
stance, typically developed vertically integrated structures that covered the 
chain from wellhead or mine shaft to the final distribution of processed prod- 
ucts; and because other leading firms shared the same fear, partnerships among 
rivals commonly appeared at various points in these vertical chains, in the form 
of jointly owned oil fields, mines, and processing facilities. Meanwhile, other 
U.S. firms, such as General Motors, Ford, and General Electric, established 
subsidiaries in Europe, to serve as bridgeheads in the event of warfare among 
industry leaders. Such bridgeheads, consistent with their function, were usu- 
ally allowed to operate with considerable independence and autonomy (Chan- 
dler  1990, 38-45,  205-33;  Wilkins and  Hill  1964, 360-79;  Wilkins  1970, 
For a decade or two after World War 11,  the defensive responses of U.S.- 
based firms to their perceived risks in world markets were a little less in evi- 
dence. The reasons were too obvious to require much comment. The proverbial 
“animal spirits” of U.S. business were already at an elevated level as a result 
of the technological lead and financial advantages that U.S. firms enjoyed over 
their European rivals. Dramatic advances in communication and transportation 
were enlarging the stage on which those spirits could be released. The real cost 
of those services was rapidly declining; and with the introduction of container- 
ized freight, airborne deliveries, and the telex, the range of those services was 
widening. These improvements expanded the business horizons of U.S.-based 
firms, allowing them to incorporate more distant locations in the marketing of 
their products and the sourcing of their needed inputs. 
The first reaction of most U.S. firms to their expanding product markets was 
to meet demands by increasing exports from the home base. But, as numerous 
case studies attest, the establishment of local producing subsidiaries soon fol- 
lowed. Almost all of the first wave of manufacturing subsidiaries established 
in foreign countries after World War  I1 were dedicated principally to serving 
the local markets in which they were placed.’ As a consequence, about four- 
fifths of the sales of such subsidiaries during the 1960s were directed to local 
markets (Lipsey and Kravis 1982,3). 
The motives of the firms in serving local markets through producing subsidi- 
aries rather than through exports were usually complex. In  some cases, for 
instance, the establishment of a producing subsidiary was simply perceived as 
a more efficient means for serving the foreign market, a consequence of the 
fact that sales in the market had achieved a level sufficient to exploit the ex- 
isting economies of  scale in production. But other factors contributed to the 
scope and timing of  these decisions as well. There were indications, for in- 
stance, that the decisions taken to establish subsidiaries abroad, whether for 
the marketing of products or for the production of required materials and com- 
93-96). 
1. Even as late as 1975, about two-thirds of the manufacturing subsidiaries of US-based firms 
were  engaged almost exclusively in  serving their local markets (Curhan, Davidson, and  Suri. 
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ponents, were often reactive measures, stimulated by and intended as a hedge 
against some perceived threat. Once a U.S.  firm lost its unique technological 
or marketing lead, as seemed inevitable in most products over the course of 
time, governments might be tempted to restrict imports in order to encourage 
domestic production. In  that case, the foreign subsidiary served to protect 
existing market access. 
But even without the threat of action by governments, U.S.-based firms fre- 
quently faced threats posed by  rivals in the product markets in which they 
operated. And some rich anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that foreign 
subsidiaries were often created as a hedge against such threats. 
That hypothesis may help to explain why, in the first few decades after World 
War 11,  U.S.-based firms were engaged in follow-the-leader behavior in the 
establishment of new producing subsidiaries abroad. Once a U.S.-based firm 
in an oligopolistically structured industry set up a producing subsidiary in a 
given country, the propensity of other US.-based firms in the oligopoly to es- 
tablish a subsidiary in the same country was visibly heightened (Knicker- 
bocker (1973, 22-27;  Yu  and Ito 1988, 449-60).  Such a pattern, of  course, 
does not conclusively demonstrate that the follower is responding defensively 
to the behavior of  the leader. Alternative hypotheses also need to be enter- 
tained, such as the possibility that both follower and leader were responding 
to a common outside stimulus or that the follower was responding in the belief 
that the leader had done a rational analysis equally applicable to both their situ- 
ations. 
However,  stimulated by  my  reading  of  various  individual cases,  I  am 
strongly inclined to attribute such follow-the-leader behavior in many cases to 
the follower’s desire to hedge a threat posed by the leader. Although the fol- 
lower may be unsure whether the leader has properly analyzed the costs and 
benefits of its move in establishing a foreign subsidiary, the follower is under- 
standably fearful of allowing a rival to enjoy the benefits of undisturbed exploi- 
tation of its foreign opportunities. As long as the number of rival producers in 
the  market is  small, therefore, following the leader often  seems to  entail 
smaller downside risks than failing to follow. Failing to follow a leader that 
was right in making its move would give that leader an unrivaled opportunity 
to increase its competitive strength, whether by increasing its marketing oppor- 
tunities or by reducing its production costs; if the leader was wrong, the follow- 
er’s  risks from committing the same error would be limited by  the leader’s 
having shared in it. 
If the hedging of a threat was sometimes necessary for the growth of U.S.- 
based multinational enterprises, however, it was certainly not sufficient for 
such growth. Still to be explained was why in so many cases U.S.-based firms 
chose to establish producing subsidiaries rather than to exploit their strengths 
through licensing or other contractual arrangements with a local firm. In some 
cases, the high transaction costs associated with searching out and dealing with 
local firms may provide an adequate explanation. But here too, I am inclined 61  Where Are  the Multinationals Headed? 
to put heavy weight on explanations that see the establishment of a subsidiary 
in part as a hedge against various risks. Whenever licensing agreements are 
negotiated, both parties face the uncertainties generated by asymmetrical infor- 
mation; the licensee is uncertain of the value of the information it is to receive, 
while the licenser is uncertain of  the use to which the licensee proposes to 
put  the  information. Moreover, enforcing the  provisions  of  any  licensing 
agreement carries both parties into areas of major uncertainty, based partly on 
the difficulties of  monitoring the agreement and partly on the difficulties of 
enforcing its provisions. 
In any event, the late 1960s registered a high watermark in the spread of the 
multinational networks of U.S.-based industrial enterprises, as the number of 
foreign affiliates added annually to such networks reached an all-time high 
(UN Commission on Transnational Corporations 1978,223). For at least a de- 
cade thereafter, the number of foreign affiliates added annually was much re- 
duced. Without firm-by-firm data of the kind compiled by the Harvard Multi- 
national Enterprise Project for the period up to 1975, it is hard to know more 
precisely what was going on at the firm level during the succeeding years. 
But the rate of  growth of  these networks appeared to pick up again in the 
late 1980s. 
The high rate of  growth in recent years, however, appears to be based on 
somewhat different factors from those that prevailed in earlier decades. Anec- 
dotal evidence indicates that U.S.-based firms continue to use their multina- 
tional networks to transfer newly generated products and processes from the 
United States to other countries. But with the U.S. lead greatly diminished in 
the generation of new products and processes, it is doubtful that the transmis- 
sion of new products and processes from U.S. parents to foreign subsidiaries 
plays as important a role in the business of  U.S.-based enterprises as it did 
some decades ago. Indeed, by the 1990s, the ostensible purpose of some U.S.- 
based firms in establishing foreign subsidiaries in Japan was  not to diffuse 
existing skills but to acquire new skills for their multinational network in the 
hope that their Japanese experience would strengthen their competitive capa- 
bilities in markets all over the world.2 With Japanese and European firms ac- 
quiring subsidiaries in the United States at the same time for the same purpose, 
it was apparent that the distinctive characteristics of U.S.-based multinational 
networks were beginning to fade. 
Another factor that began to change the behavior of U.S.-based enterprises 
was the increasing familiarity of their managers with the problems of operating 
in foreign environments. At least until the 1970s, in their decisions when and 
where to establish subsidiaries in foreign countries, U.S.-based firms had been 
2. See “American Business Starts a Counterattack in Japan,” New York Times, Feb. 24 (1992, 
p. 1). A survey conducted by Japan’s Ministry for International Trade and Industry in January 1990 
reports that  38 percent of  the  foreign direct investors in Japan  responding to the survey listed 
“engineering skill is high  as a reason for their investment, while 18 percent listed “collection of 
technical information and market information.”  Reproduced in Nippon 1991 (1992, 109). 62  Raymond Vernon 
giving a heavy preference to the familiar. Careful analyses of the geographical 
sequence by  which these firms established manufacturing facilities abroad 
demonstrated a historically heavy preference for setting up the first foreign 
production unit in Canada, with the United Kingdom taking second place and 
Mexico third.3  By the 1960s, U.S.-based firms were bypassing Canada for Eu- 
rope and Latin America as the first point of foreign manufacture; by the 197Os, 
although Europe and Latin America continued to provide the principal first- 
production sites, Asian sites were beginning to turn up with increasing fre- 
quency4 (Vernon and Davidson 1979,52, 134-35). 
The role played by experience during these early postwar decades could be 
seen even more directly by trends in the reaction times of U.S.-based firms in 
setting up foreign production facilities. Where new products were involved, 
US-based firms characteristically set up their first production sites within the 
United States. Eventually, however, they set up production sites abroad as well; 
as these firms gained experience with producing in a given country, the time 
interval involved in setting up production facilities in the country for new prod- 
ucts showed a marked decline. Moreover, as the number of foreign production 
sites in any product increased, the time interval in setting up another facility in 
a foreign country also declined. By the 1970s,  therefore, U.S.-based firms were 
beginning to show less hesitation in setting up production subsidiaries abroad 
for their new products and were scanning a rapidly widening circle of countries 
for their production sites. 
The pattern toward which U.S.-owned multinational networks seem to be 
moving, therefore, is one in which the parent firm in the United States is pre- 
pared to survey different geographic locations on their respective merits, with 
a much reduced presumption in favor of  a U.S. location. Instead, when as- 
signing tasks to the various units of their multinational networks, U.S. business 
managers are increasingly likely to discount the distinction between home- 
based and foreign facilities, except as governmental restraints compel them to 
recognize that factor. This does not mean that the role played by geography is 
altogether obliterated. U.S.-based firms, for instance, continue to rely on Latin 
America more than on Asia to provide their low-cost labor needs, while the 
reverse is true for Japanese  firm^.^ But the sense of uncertainty associated with 
producing outside the home economy has substantially declined, and the pref- 
3.  The generalizations are based on an unpublished study of the manufacturing subsidiaries of 
180 U.S.-based multinational enterprises as of 1964. The 180  firms, whose multinational networks 
are covered in the computerized files of the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project, were all 
large US.-based firms with substantial foreign manufacturing facilities (Vaupel 197  1). 
4. The study is based on the same multinational enterprises as those in Vaupel(l971). Conclu- 
sions in the two paragraphs following are based on data in the same study. 
5. United Nations data affirm the preferences of US.-based and Japan-based firms for direct 
investment in nearby locations during the years 1971 to 1986, as well as the tendency of these 
geographical preferences to decline over time (UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 1988, 
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erence for nearby production locations such as those in Latin America over 
more remote locations such as those in Asia has declined as well. 
For enterprises operating in oligopolistic markets, however, a major source 
of uncertainty remains. Even when such enterprises are fully familiar with the 
foreign environments in which they are obliged to operate, they are still ex- 
posed to the predatory and preemptive tactics of their rivals in the oligopoly. 
The reasoning that led the international oil and minerals firms to develop verti- 
cally integrated structures before World War 11, therefore, can be glimpsed in 
more recent decades in the behavior of US-based firms operating in oligopo- 
listic markets. For instance, US.-based oil companies, having been separated 
from some of  their captive crude oil supplies by  the nationalizations in the 
1970s, remain unwilling to rely upon the open market for the bulk of  such 
supplies despite the existence of a large public market for the product. Facing 
the latent threat posed by the vertical integration of the Saudi and Venezuelan 
state-owned oil companies, US.-based firms are repairing and strengthening 
their upstream links.6 
Such cautionary behavior is not confined to the raw  materials industries. 
Similar behavior is apparent among U.S. firms in the electronics industry: un- 
der pressure to reduce the costs of labor-intensive components, firms such as 
IBM and Texas Instruments have chosen to manufacture a considerable part of 
their needs within their own multinational networks rather than to rely upon 
independent suppliers. A major factor in that decision, according to many ob- 
servers, has been the fear that predatory rivals might withhold the most ad- 
vanced versions of  those components from competitors while incorporating 
them in their own products. (US. Congress 1991,97-100;  Schwartz 1992, esp. 
149; Teece 1987,65-95.) 
For some US.-based enterprises, it was only a small step from using their 
foreign subsidiaries as feeders for manufacturing facilities in the United States 
to using those facilities to fill requirements arising anywhere in the network; 
by the 1980s, it had become apparent that this process was well advanced (Lip- 
sey  1988). Of  course, in practically every multinational network, the parent 
unit in the United States typically continued to occupy a unique position: char- 
acteristically, the parent’s U.S.  sales still accounted for the bulk of  network 
sales, its U.S. facilities were responsible for the most important research and 
development work in the network, and its U.S. offices still coordinated some 
of the network’s functions that might benefit from a centralized approach, such 
as the finance function. But the direction was clear. Although the centralized 
functions of  the network would presumably remain in the United States in- 
definitely, the historical and institutional forces that resisted the geographical 
6. For an account of the downstream movements of the various state-owned oil companies, and 
of new upstream ties forged by Gulf Oil, Sun Oil, Citgo, and Texaco, see Business Week  1988. 64  Raymond Vernon 
diffusion of other functions to locations outside the United States were grow- 
ing weaker. 
A more novel trend, however,  has been the growing propensity of  U.S.- 
based firms to enter into alliances of  one kind or another with multinational 
networks based in  other countries-typically,  in other highly industrialized 
countries. Such alliances, for instance, sometimes take the form of a joint sub- 
sidiary established to perform a specified function or of  an exchange of  li- 
censes in a specified field. At times, the arrangements link suppliers to their 
customers; at other times, the parties involved in such limited linkages appear 
to be direct rivals. A considerable literature is already developing regard- 
ing the operation of  these alliances (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Gomes- 
Casseres 1989; Lewis 1990; Lynch 1989; Parkhe 1991). Although the defini- 
tions are muddy and the data far from complete, such alliances seem to be 
concentrated  in industries in which barriers to entry are high and technological 
change is rapid and costly. 
Part of the motivation for these alliances is apparent: an effort of each of the 
participating firms to reduce the risks associated with lumpy commitments to 
new research and development projects and to ensure that they are abreast of 
their competitors in their research resources. The alliances, therefore, are not 
much different in function from the jointly owned mines and oil fields that 
rival refiners and marketers shared in decades gone by, such as ARAMCO in 
Saudi Arabia, Southern Peru Copper in Peru, and HALCO in Guinea. More- 
over, with common interests linking rivals to their suppliers and to one another 
in these new alliances, the likelihood that any one of the rivals might steal a 
technological lead on the others is obviously reduced. As with the partners in 
the raw material subsidiaries,  therefore, there may well be a sense among some 
of  the partners in the new  alliances that their ties with rivals and suppliers 
could be used to reduce the harshness of future competition among them. 
In one respect, however, many of the new alliances differ from those in the 
raw material industries. In industries with rapidly changing technologies and 
swiftly changing markets, the interests of the participants in any given alliance 
are likely to be relatively unstable; such firms will be constantly withdrawing 
and regrouping in order to satisfy their rapidly shifting strategic needs. Never- 
theless, the possibility remains very real that these arrangements will serve at 
times to take the edge off the competition in some product markets. 
For all the evidence that defensive motivations have been dominating the 
behavior of U.S.-based enterprises,  there are various signs that the animal spir- 
its of some U.S. managers can still be roused. One sign of such spirits is the 
global spread of U.S.-based firms in various service industries, including fast 
foods,  advertising  services,  and  management  consulting. Some  of  these 
service-oriented  firms developed multinational networks simply by following 
their multinational clients abroad in an effort to maintain an existing relation- 
ship; others, relying on a technological or managerial capability that their for- 
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without any apparent defensive motivation. Such initiatives, it appears, depend 
on the extent to which enterprises feel protected by some unique firm capabil- 
ity, such as a technological or managerial lead, or a patent or trademark.7  But 
whether such situations are common or not in the future, defensive responses 
can be counted on to compel many large firms in the United States to maintain 
and extend their multinational networks. 
3.2  Emergence of the Europeans 
European industry often enjoys a reputation among Americans for sophisti- 
cation and urbanity that equips them especially for the role of global entrepre- 
neurs. But their performance as a group after World War I1 presents a very 
mixed picture. 
In the decades just prior to World War 11, the principal strategy of the leading 
European firms was to protect their home markets from competition, not to 
seek out new foreign markets. When they established subsidiaries in foreign 
countries, they tended to concentrate on countries to which their home govern- 
ments had close political ties (Frank0 1976, 81). And their typical reaction to 
the threat of international competition in those decades was to develop market- 
sharing arrangements along national lines. 
In the immediate postwar period, European firms continued to cling to their 
home markets. Absorbed in the rebuilding of their home economies and sad- 
dled with the need to catch up technologically, they had little slack to devote 
to the establishment of new foreign facilities. True, enterprises headquartered 
in some of the smaller countries that possessed a technological edge, such as 
the pharmaceutical companies of Switzerland and the Netherlands and the ma- 
chinery firms of Sweden, often felt compelled to set up subsidiaries outside 
their home countries in order to exploit their technological lead and to finance 
their ongoing innovational efforts; and the subsidiaries they set up in foreign 
countries typically operated with greater autonomy in foreign locations than 
did subsidiaries of  some of their U.S. rivals. Moreover, manufacturing firms 
headquartered in the larger European countries were not altogether averse to 
establishing producing subsidiaries in areas over which their home govern- 
ments still exercised strong political or economic influence. Between 1945 and 
1965, for instance, British parents established about four hundred manufactur- 
ing  subsidiaries in  Australia, Canada, and  New  Zealand. (Harvard  Multi- 
national Enterprise Project data banks). 
The disposition of European firms to identify closely with their home gov- 
ernments has some of its roots in history. Until recently, many were family- 
owned enterprises, with a long history of  dominance in some given city or 
7. The reader will recognize this theme as a major element in John H. Dunning’s “eclectic 
theory.” For his view of U.S.  foreign direct investment trends in relation to the theory, see Dunning 
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region. Some were so-called national champions, accustomed to especially 
favorable treatment by  their governments in the provision of  capital and the 
purchase of  output (Michalet 1974, 105-25).  The idea of  maintaining close 
ties to their home government when operating abroad therefore represented an 
easy extension of their relationship at home. 
After 1960, the emergence of a common market on the European continent 
began to affect the strategies of European firms. At first, however, these devel- 
opments did little to encourage European firms to set up subsidiaries in other 
countries within the area. For one thing, the promise of  a duty-free market 
among members of the European Community actually served to eliminate one 
of the motivations for creating such subsidiaries, namely the threat that fron- 
tiers might be closed to foreign goods. And with land distances relatively small 
and national markets relatively limited in size, the economic reasons for estab- 
lishing such subsidiaries often did not appear compelling. 
On the other hand, by the 1960s, US.-based companies were beginning to 
set up their subsidiaries in Europe in large numbers. Data from the Harvard 
Multinational Enterprise Project show that whereas, in the fifteen years be- 
tween 1945 and 1959, U.S. parents had established some three hundred manu- 
facturing subsidiaries in Europe, between 1960 and 1975 these parents estab- 
lished nearly two thousand manufacturing subsidiaries in Europe. Typically, 
the first landing of the U.S. invaders was in the United Kingdom, despite that 
country’s delay in entering the European Community; but the U.S.-based firms 
were not long in establishmg subsidiaries on the continent as well. 
One might have expected the appearance of these subsidiaries to stimulate 
moves to renew the restrictive market-sharing agreements of the prewar period, 
but the environment following the end of World War I1 was much less condu- 
cive to such agreements. For one thing, rapidly expanding markets and swiftly 
changing technologies generated an environment that made agreements diffi- 
cult. In addition, although enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws had grown lax 
in the postwar period, the European Community itself had adopted and was 
occasionally enforcing some exemplary measures aimed at preventing enter- 
prises from dividing up the European market (Goyder 1988, esp. 71-133). 
Eventually, however, most large European firms were led through the same 
defensive cycle that some U.S.-based firms had already experienced. Having 
reestablished export markets for their manufactured goods in many areas, in- 
cluding the Middle East and Latin America, they faced the same kind of threat 
that had moved their U.S. counterparts to set up producing subsidiaries abroad, 
namely the fear of losing a market through import restrictions. By 1970, manu- 
facturing firms based in Europe were adding affiliates to their multinational 
networks in numbers over twice as high as those recorded by their U.S. coun- 
terparts (Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project data). 
Moved largely by  defensive considerations, European firms were adding 
rapidly to their holdings in the United States. There they showed a strong pref- 
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and a strong disposition to team up with a U.S. firm in the process.8 Such 
entries, some European managers supposed, would give them exposure to the 
latest industrial technologies and marketing strategies, thus strengthening their 
ability to resist the U.S. onslaught in their home markets and in third countries. 
By the end of  the 1960s, however, the Europeans had begun to have  less 
reason to fear the dominance of U.S.-based firms. The differences in techno- 
logical achievement between U.S. firms and European firms had obviously 
shrunk, and access to capital no longer favored the Americans. Not surpris- 
ingly, then, some of the motivations that lay behind the expansion of the Euro- 
pean networks grew more nearly akin to that of the Americans-that  is, largely 
defensive moves aimed at protecting a foreign market from import restrictions 
or copycat responses to the initiatives of rivals in setting up a subsidiary abroad 
(Flowers  1976).9 In  an  apparent response to  such  stimuli, the  number  of 
European-owned subsidiaries appearing in various parts of the world increased 
rapidly (Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project data). 
These new transborder relations have not wholly obliterated the distinctive 
national traits that have characterized European firms. German enterprises, for 
instance, continue to huddle in the shelter of their big banks, French companies 
in the protective cover of their national ministries. Moreover, despite the exis- 
tence of the European Community, European firms continue to owe their ex- 
istence to their respective national enabling statutes, which reflect wide differ- 
ences in philosophical values and political balance. The United Kingdom, for 
instance, cannot agree with its continental partners on such fundamental issues 
as the responsibilities of the corporation to its labor force; whereas the British 
tend to see corporate managers primarily as the agents of their stockholders, 
continental  governments  generally take  the  view  that  labor  has  a  quasi- 
proprietary stake in the enterprise that employs it, which stake managers are 
obliged to recognize. Differences such as these have served to block projects 
for the creation of  a European company under the European Community’s 
aegis. 
Nevertheless, cross-border mergers are growing in number in Europe. In 
1987, among the large industrial enterprises based in the community, only 75 
cases were recorded in which a firm based in one EC country gained control 
of a firm based in another, but by  1990 the number had risen to 257 (European 
Commission 1991, 228).  Indeed, in this universe of large industrial firms, the 
number of such transborder acquisitions in 1990 for the first time exceeded the 
number of like acquisitions involving firms in a single member country. 
8. In the period from 1960 to 1970, about 80 percent of the manufacturing subsidiaries  estab- 
lished by European parents in the United States were through acquisition or mergers with US. 
firms. The comparable figure for manufacturing subsidiaries of  U.S. parents in Europe for the 
same period was 67 percent (Harvard Multinational  Enterprise Project data). 
9. The assumption that the spread of European networks was due in part to follow-the-leader 
behavior, at least until the 1970s, is fortified by  some unpublished studies undertaken by  Fred 
Knickerbocker (1973), whose analysis of the behavior of US.-based manufacturing subsidiaries 
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In part, the trend toward cross-border mergers is a consequence of the many 
liberalizing measures that the member countries of the European Community 
have taken with regard to capital flows. In addition, however, there appears to 
be a visible weakening of the family conglomerate, a distinctly national form 
of  big business. In Italy, for instance, where that kind of  structure has been 
particularly prominent in the private sector, the country's leading family con- 
glomerates have fallen on especially hard times.1° 
The disposition of many firms to cling to the shreds of their national identity 
will lead many of them to hesitate over transborder mergers and consolidations 
in which they are not the surviving entity or, when they finally succumb to the 
pressures for merger, to insist on retaining a minority interest in the subsidiary 
that has been joined to the network of the foreign-based firm. That same dispo- 
sition suggests why European firms appear to give a heavier preference to con- 
sortia and alliances as a way of combining their strengths with a foreign firm 
than US.-based competitors would do. But, because I see such arrangements 
as fragile over time, I see transborder mergers as the preferred vehicle in spite 
of  the obstacles. Such mergers may  still generate resistance and hostility in 
some countries." A few decades from now, however, the national differences 
in Europe's business communities are likely to prove no more important than 
the  differences between  Texas-based enterprises and  Massachusetts-based 
enterprises in the United States. 
In explaining the growth of the networks of  firms based in Europe, then, I 
return to some of the same themes that were stressed in the case of U.S.-based 
firms. The summary of the factors that have pushed U.S.-based enterprises to 
develop and expand their multinational networks in the past decades stressed 
the continuous improvements in the technology of communication and trans- 
portation as the powerful exogenous factor; the decisions of  the US.-based 
firms to expand their enterprises were seen in large part as a response aimed at 
reducing the uncertainties and countering the threats that accompanied such 
developments. I feel sure that these generalizations will carry the observer a 
considerable distance in understanding the behavior of Europe-based firms as 
well.'* Over time, the differences  that heretofore have distinguished  U.S.-based 
from Europe-based multinational networks are likely to diminish as the condi- 
tions of their founding and early growth begin to lose their original importance. 
3.3  Latecomer Japan 
Studying the factors behind the growth of multinational enterprises  based in 
Japan, a phenomenon of the past two or three decades, will bring us back to 
10.  For an account of the troubles of the Agnelli and Pirelli family conglomerates, see Finan- 
11.  For a rich account of such hostilities in France's reactions to the Agnelli family's efforts to 
12.  A study of European banking confirms the existence of each of the major tendencies in- 
cial Times (1992a). 
acquire control over Perrier, see Financial Times (1992~). 
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the same defensive motivations, including the need of Japanese enterprises to 
protect their interests against the hostile acts of foreign governments and busi- 
ness  competitors,  and  their  desire  to  build  up  competitive  strengths by 
exposing themselves to the most  challenging technological and marketing 
environments. 
Indeed, the defensive motivations that commonly lie behind the creation and 
spread of multinational enterprises are likely to act even more powerfully on 
the Japanese than on their U.S  .-based and Europe-based competitors. To see 
why, it helps to review briefly the evolution of Japan’s industrial structure (see, 
e.g., Wilkins 1990, 585-629). 
From the earliest years of  the Meiji restoration in the last decades of  the 
nineteenth century, the industrial structure of Japan exhibited some distinctive 
national characteristics. Dominating the core of Japan’s modem economy were 
half a dozen conglomerate organizations, each with its own captive bank, trad- 
ing company, and portfolio of manufacturing and service enterprises. The con- 
glomerate structure, well developed before World War 11, was modified only a 
little by  Japan’s loss of its foreign territories and by the ensuing occupation. 
Japanese firms lost their investments in the territories its armies had occupied, 
but these investments had largely been controlled by  the so-called new  zai- 
batsu, companies that depended for their existence on Japan’s  foreign con- 
quests and that had very little stake in the home economy itself. 
In Japan proper, the holding companies that sat at the apex of each conglom- 
erate were liquidated during the occupation. But the member firms of the con- 
glomerates maintained their old ties by  cross-holdings of stock and by  shared 
memories of past loyalties. And in the 1960s and 1970s, as foreign enterprises 
began to show some interest in acquiring control over Japanese firms, member 
firms within each conglomerate systematically built up their cross-holdings 
even further as a means of repelling foreign boarders (Ito 1992, 191). 
From the early emergence of these conglomerate organizations, a fierce ri- 
valry existed among them-but  a rivalry based much more on comparative 
rates of growth and market shares than on nominal profits. Within each con- 
glomerate, the financing of the contest was left to the conglomerate’s captive 
bank rather than to public capital markets. But the general scope and direction 
of  the lending by  these banks to their affiliates were largely determined by 
continuous consultation with key government agencies, especially the Ministry 
of  Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Ministry for International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
By the 1980s, however, it was becoming apparent that major changes were 
taking place in the conglomerate structures. Perhaps the most obvious change 
was the dramatic shift in the financing practices of the industrial firms. As the 
rate of growth of the Japanese economy slowed up a little in the 1980s and as 
the need to finance capacity expansion grew less urgent, Japanese firms found 
that internally generated cash was going a much longer way toward meeting 
their capital needs. 
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financial intermediaries, the Ministry of  Finance was gradually relaxing its 
tight controls over the development of internal capital markets, thereby provid- 
ing Japanese companies for the first time with a real option for raising their 
capital needs through the sale of  securities in public markets. Concurrently, 
Japanese firms were being granted permission to raise capital in foreign cur- 
rencies by  selling their securities abroad or borrowing from foreign banks. 
Japanese banks, trading houses, and other service facilities, therefore, were 
strongly represented in the outflow of direct investment from Japan to major 
foreign markets.I3  And because Japanese manufacturing firms were always a 
little uncomfortable when dealing with foreigners as service suppliers, the ex- 
istence of those service facilities in foreign markets eased the way for the man- 
ufacturers to establish their foreign subsidiaries outside of  Japan (Gittelman 
and Dunning 1992,237-67). 
In accounting for the changes in the character of the multinational networks 
based in Japan, however, one must place particularly heavy emphasis on the 
increasing technological capabilities of  these enterprises. In  the  very  first 
stages of the development of multinational networks by Japan-based firms, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, some scholars entertained the hypothesis that these firms 
would develop a pattern of foreign direct investment quite different from that 
pioneered by  U.S.-based and Europe-based firms (Kojima 1978, 85-87).  At 
that stage, Japan’s penetration of foreign markets for manufactured goods was 
most in evidence in South and Southeast Asia and was heavily concentrated in 
relatively simple items such as batteries, noodles, radios, and other consumer 
goods-items  in which Japan’s  comparative advantage was already fading. 
Given the unsophisticated nature of  the products and the lack of  a need for 
after-sales services, Japanese producers usually used their affiliated trading 
companies as their agents in these foreign markets; indeed, in many cases, the 
Japanese producers were not large enough even to consider marketing their 
own products abroad and so had no choice but to rely on trading companies. 
In these cases, when the risk that the government might impose restrictions 
became palpable, the trading company typically took the lead in establishing a 
local production facility, often through a three-way partnership that combined 
the trading company with a local distributor and with the erstwhile Japanese 
exporter (Yoshino 1976,95-126). From this early pattern, it appeared that the 
Japan-based multinational enterprise might root itself much more deeply in its 
foreign markets than did the U.S .-based and Europe-based companies, with 
results that might prove more benign from the viewpoint of the host country. 
By the 1980s, however, the patterns of foreign direct investment by Japanese 
firms were converging toward the norms recorded by their U.S. and European 
rivals (Encarnation 1992, 9-35).  As with U.S.- and Europe-based firms, the 
13. In the 1980s, the relative importance of services in the outflow of foreign direct investment 
from Japan was substantially higher than for FDI outflow from the United States, the United King- 
dom, West Germany, or France (UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 1991, 16, table 6). 71  Where Are the Multinationals Headed? 
object of  Japanese firms in establishing a producing subsidiary in a foreign 
country was commonly to protect a market in a relatively differentiated prod- 
uct that originally had been developed through exports from Japan. 
Compared with U.S.-based or Europe-based firms, however, the stake of 
Japanese firms in the export markets of  other industrialized countries soon 
grew very large.14  The spectacular growth of Japanese exports to the markets 
of such countries exposed Japanese firms once more to threats of restrictive 
action on a major scale. At this advanced stage, however, the markets to be 
protected were considerably different in character from those that the first gen- 
eration of  Japan-based multinationals had developed. One difference was in 
the identity of the markets under siege, now located mainly in the United States 
and Europe. Another was the nature of the products involved; these were rela- 
tively sophisticated products, such as automobiles, camcorders, and computer- 
controlled machine tools. And  a third was  the channels of  distribution in- 
volved; such sophisticated products were usually marketed through channels 
under the direct control of the manufacturers rather than through trading com- 
panies. 
The networks that Japan-based firms created in response to the new threats 
came closer to emulating those of the U.S.-based and Europe-based firms with 
multinational networks. Moreover, as with their European rivals, many of the 
foreign acquisitions by Japan-based firms were explained by a desire to acquire 
advanced technological skills; this motive was especially apparent in the acqui- 
sition of  various medium-sized high-tech firms in the United States (Kester 
1991; Kogut and Chang 1991). 
Although the multinational networks that Japan-based firms produced in this 
second generation bore a much greater resemblance to the networks of  their 
counterparts from other advanced industrialized countries, some characteristic 
differences remained. One  such  characteristic was  the  high  propensity of 
Japan-based multinationals to control their producing subsidiaries tightly from 
Japan. Symptomatic of that fact was the near-universal use of Japanese person- 
nel to head their foreign subsidiaries.15  A striking illustration of the same desire 
for control was the limited leeway allowed subsidiaries in the acquisition of 
capital equipment. Australian subsidiaries of Japanese firms, for instance, pos- 
sessed far less leeway in the selection of new machinery than did the subsidiar- 
ies of U.S.-based or Europe-based firms (Kreinin 1988). Some signs existed in 
the 1990s that a few Japanese firms were breaking away from their traditional 
controls and giving their foreign subsidiaries greater leeway, but the illustra- 
tions were still exceptional (Economist 1992). 
14. Data on the identities of the world’s leading multinationals in the latter 1980s, with partial 
statistics on their respective stakes in foreign markets gleaned primarily from annual reports, ap- 
pear in UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (1978,287-316). 
15. For instance, a study of the US.  subsidiaries of Japanese electronic firms reports that only 
2 percent of Japanese electronics firms in the United States had US. chief executive officers (U.S. 
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The early reluctance of Japan-based firms to develop a multinational net- 
work and the tendency of the foreign subsidiaries of such firms to rely upon 
their established sources in Japan have been attributed to a number of different 
factors. They have been variously explained as a consequence of the relative 
inexperience of Japanese firms with the novel problems of producing abroad, 
as a result of  the heavy reliance on the consensual process in firm decision 
making, or as a consequence of  the extensive use of just-in-time producing 
processes, which demand the closest coordination between the firms and their 
suppliers (Kester 1991, 109). Introducing strangers into the system, according 
to the argument, entails major modifications in firm practices that cannot be 
achieved overnight. 
Nevertheless, by  the end of  the 1980s, Japan-based firms were expanding 
their multinational networks at an unprecedented rate. What is more, their 
manufacturing affiliates in the United States and Europe were drawing a con- 
siderable fraction of their inputs from sources located in the host country (Git- 
telman and Dunning 1992, 40). Moreover, it appeared that some of the very 
factors that had slowed the growth of  Japan-based multinational networks in 
the past could be expected to reinforce the expansion rather than to slow it 
down. For example, the desire of Japanese firms to rely on Japanese sources 
means that the foreign subsidiaries of major Japanese firms are pulling large 
numbers of satellite suppliers with them into foreign locations. While this has 
not been an unknown phenomenon in the establishment of the multinational 
networks of  firms based in the United States, it appears to be an especially 
powerful force in the case of  Japan-based  firms (Wilkins 1990, 612-16).16 
Moreover, if  one pair of  authoritative observers is to be believed, Japanese 
firms already are being drawn into Europe by  the conviction that they must 
assimilate some distinctive regional emphases if they are to be successful in 
major industries, such as automobiles and electronic equipment (Gittelman 
and Dunning 1992). Finally, given the intense rivalry of Japanese firms, with 
their stress on market share, it is not unreasonable to expect a pattern of copy- 
cat behavior even stronger than that observed with respect to firms based in 
other countries. 
Whether the Japanese government will seek at some point to restrain the 
overseas movement of its firms through administrative guidance is unclear; but 
even if it makes such an attempt, there is no certainty that the attempt would 
prove effective. The growing financial independence of Japanese firms means 
that the Ministry of Finance and MITI have lost one of their principal sources 
of coercion. The Japanese firms’ commitment of  a large proportion of  their 
assets to foreign locations means that they will be exposed to stimuli not strik- 
16. A hint of the  strong tendency of Japanese firms to buy from enterprises with which they 
have close links appears also in Gittelman and Dunning (1992). See also Financial Times (1992a), 
an  account of Nissan’s impact on northeast England. 73  Where Are the Multinationals Headed? 
ingly different from those affecting their U.S. and European rivals. Develop- 
ments such as these promise to contribute to the movement of Japan-based 
multinationals toward the norms typical of multinationals based in other coun- 
tries (Lipsey 1991, 87). 
3.4  Patterns of the Future 
In the future as in the past, some powerful exogenous factors will influence 
the spread of multinational enterprises, including changes in the technologies 
of transportation, communication, and production. But it is not easy to project 
the consequences of such changes. For instance, if just-in-time manufacturing 
takes on added strength, the clustering tendency of related enterprises should 
grow stronger; but if flexible manufacturing processes gain in strength, smaller 
and more self-contained plans could dominate, reducing the tendency toward 
clusters (Auty 1992; Dunning 1992, esp. 158-62). Despite uncertainties of this 
sort, however, I anticipate that multinational networks and transborder alli- 
ances, already a major factor in international economic flows, will grow in im- 
portance. 
3.4.1  The Response of Governments 
How governments will respond to that  situation is a little uncertain. Al- 
though globalization and convergence may prove to be major trends defining 
the behavior of multinational enterprises in the future, it is implausible to as- 
sume that national governments will stand aside and allow such behavior to 
develop as it  may.  With jobs,  taxes,  payment balances, and  technological 
achievement seemingly at stake, governments are bound to act in an  effort 
to defend national interests and respond to national pressures. Their efforts, 
involving carrots in  some cases and sticks in others, will continue to  pose 
threats and offer opportunities to the multinationals. 
Some governmental responses will take the form of restrictions, unilaterally 
adopted, aimed at holding inbound and outbound foreign investment in check. 
But from all the signs, political leaders in the major industrialized countries 
seem aware that national autarky is not an available option unless a country is 
prepared to absorb some overwhelming costs. That recognition explains why 
so many countries now eye the possibility of developing regional blocs-areas 
large enough to satisfy the modern requirements of scale and scope, and small 
enough to promise member countries that they will exert some influence in 
shaping their joint economic policies. 
There is surface plausibility to the idea that such blocs may figure impor- 
tantly in the future, a plausibility reflected in the preeminence of  Japanese 
interests in South and Southeast Asia, European interests in Africa, Eastern 
Europe, and the Middle East, and U.S. interests in Latin America. But it is 
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gested, they may reflect little more than the myopic learning process of busi- 
ness managers, and increasing experience may  push them toward  scanning 
over a wider geographical range. 
In any case, when seen through the eyes of the managers of  multinational 
enterprises based in the industrialized areas, the managers’ principal stake by 
far lies in other industrialized areas, not in the hinterlands of their respective 
“regions.” That has been the case for decades, and it has shown no signs of 
changing in recent years. To be sure, such enterprises will not hesitate to use 
the influence of their respective governments to promote their interests in these 
regions. But from the viewpoint of the firms, such efforts will be a sideshow 
compared to their respective stakes in other industrialized economies. 
At the same time, the influence that individual governments are in a position 
to exert over their respective multinational enterprises appears rapidly on the 
decline. Although governments have been known to remain blind to the obvi- 
ous for remarkably prolonged periods of  time, that  ineluctable fact should 
eventually lead them to limit their unilateral efforts at control. Where control 
of some sort still seems necessary or desirable, the option remaining will be to 
pursue mutually agreed-upon measures with other countries. In the decades 
ahead, the United States, Europe, and Japan are sure to find themselves ad- 
dressing the feasibility and desirability of international agreements that define 
more fully the rights and obligations of  multinational enterprises. Although 
most other countries may be slower to address the issue, a few such as Singa- 
pore and Mexico along with the non-European members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are likely to be involved 
as well. Already some of the elements of an international system are in place 
with respect to a few functional fields, such as the levying of corporate income 
taxes. It does not stretch the imagination very much to picture international 
agreements on such subjects as the competition of  governments for foreign 
direct investment, the threats to market competition posed by restrictive busi- 
ness practices and mergers, the rights and obligations of multinational enter- 
prises in national political processes, and other issues relating to the multi- 
national enterprise. 
3.4.2  The Development of Theory 
In the past, as multinational networks appeared and grew, some researchers 
concerned with understanding the causes of their behavior found it useful, even 
indispensable, to distinguish such enterprises according to their national base. 
If I am right in seeing strong tendencies toward national convergence, distinc- 
tions based on the national origin of the network are likely to lose their analytic 
and descriptive value, and distinctions on other dimensions are likely to grow 
in importance. Even more than in the past, distinctions based on the character- 
istics of  the product market and the production process are likely to prove 
particularly fruitful. 
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works in response to perceived threats and operated under circumstances in 
which ignorance and uncertainty were endemic. For the most part, the enter- 
prises operated in product markets with significant barriers to entry, including 
static and dynamic scale economies, patents and trademarks. With the passage 
of time, however, a considerable proportion of these multinational enterprises 
overcame their sense of acute uncertainty in foreign markets, especially as the 
products and their related technologies grew more stable and standardized. 
These tendencies often reduced barriers to entry, increased the number of 
participants, and elevated the role of price competition. In the production and 
sale of  metals and petroleum, for instance, the number of  sellers on world 
markets inexorably increased, and the role of competitive pricing grew. In big- 
ticket consumer electronics, an intensification of  competitive pricing among 
multinational enterprises also has become commonplace, despite the persistent 
efforts of sellers to differentiate their products. In such cases, there is consid- 
erable utility in models that cast the participants as fully informed actors op- 
erating in  a market in which their choices are known, under conditions in 
which  some scale economies exist (Helpman and Krugman 1985, 225-59; 
Grossman and Helpman 1991, 197-200). I see no reason why models based 
on these assumptions should not generate useful first approximations to the 
behavior of multinational enterprises in a considerable number of industries. 
Other models may also have something to contribute, such as those that view 
multinational networks as the consequence of decisions by firms to internalize 
certain types of transactions. The international market for the sale of technol- 
ogy and management skills, for instance, is a grossly inefficient market from 
the viewpoint of both buyer and seller (Teece 1986; Galbraith and Kay  1986). 
Internalization can be viewed as a response to those inefficiencies, in a setting 
in which the enterprises are otherwise fully aware of  the set of choices they 
confront and of  the facts bearing on those choices (Casson 1987, 1-49;  Wil- 
liamson 1971). 
Models based on the internalization hypothesis therefore fit comfortably 
into the structure of the models described earlier, which are based essentially 
on a neoclassical framework driven by costs and prices. But they have tended 
to crowd out the analysis of other motivations that seem at least as important 
in explaining the behavior of the managers of  such enterprises. For instance, 
various measures taken by  the firm to create a multinational network may be 
driven by another motive, namely a desire to avoid being exposed to the preda- 
tory behavior of rivals, including the risk that such rivals might cut off needed 
supplies or deny access to a distribution system during some future contin- 
gency. 
That possibility pushes  the modeler in  a  very  different direction in  at- 
tempting to explain the behavior of multinational enterprises. Such enterprises 
continue to figure prominently in many product markets that have not yet at- 
tained a stable middle age. In such markets, the number of producers is often 
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technologies are in flux, and price differences are not the critical factor in com- 
petition. Moreover, externalities of various kinds commonly play a dominant 
role in locational decisions, as when enterprises try to draw on various national 
environments to produce the stimuli they think will improve their competitive 
strengths. Firms engaged in producing microprocessors, aircraft engines, and 
wonder drugs, for instance, are strongly influenced by one or  another of these 
factors. 
Needless to say, where the number of  rivals in a market is low, that fact 
fundamentally conditions the strategies of the participants. Some of them may 
long for the security of a market-sharing arrangement and may even take some 
tentative steps in that direction, such as entering into partnerships with some of 
their rivals. But developing an effective market-sharing arrangement is usually 
difficult and dangerous. 
In any event, when a limited number of participants are involved in a product 
market, theorists must entertain the possibility that the firms that are engaged 
in such markets see any given transaction as only one move in a campaign 
stretching across time. In each transaction, the principal objective of the firm 
is to strengthen its position in relation to its rivals or to neutralize the efforts 
of  its rivals to steal a march; with that objective paramount, share of  market 
becomes a critical measure of success. In such circumstances, invading a rival’s 
principal market may prove a useful defensive strategy, aimed at reducing the 
rival’s propensity for warfare elsewhere. And, given the imperfect knowledge 
under which each firm is assumed to operate, a policy of following a rival into 
new areas of supply and new markets may be seen as a prudent response to the 
rival’s initiatives.17 
Of course, by shedding many of the assumptions underlying the neoclassical 
model, models built on such behavioral assumptions relinquish the support 
provided by a comprehensive body of well-explored theory. Instead, the ana- 
lyst is thrown into a world of uncertain outcomes, explored so far largely by 
game theorists, specialists in signaling theory, and others outside the neoclassi- 
cal mainstream. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that most of the scholars who 
have sought to model the behavior of the multinational enterprise have avoided 
the implications of high uncertainty and limited numbers, preferring instead to 
concentrate on hypotheses that require less radical departures from neoclassi- 
cal assumptions. 
Nevertheless, any serious effort to project the behavior of multinational en- 
terprises in the future will have to recognize that the players in many major 
product and service markets will see themselves as engaged in a campaign 
against specific adversaries in a global market, with individual decisions being 
shaped in light of that perception. At different times and places, there will be 
17.  Casson (1987,53-83)  and Bower (1992) omit any reference to such possibilities. See also 
Graham and Krugrnan (1989), where such possibilities are presented not in the theory section of 
the report but  in an annex entitled “Industrial-Organization Explanations of  Foreign Direct In- 
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efforts to call a truce, efforts to weaken specific adversaries, and efforts to 
counter the aggressive behavior of others. The behavior that emerges will not 
be easily explained in terms of  models that  satisfy neoclassical conditions. 
Therein lies a major challenge for those who are attempting to cast light on the 
behavior of multinational enterprises through systematic modeling. 
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Comment  Richard E. Caves 
Raymond Vernon writes about the changing activity patterns of multinational 
enterprises from a long and intense involvement with the subject. His observa- 
tions cover important trends or attributes in three areas of their operations: (1) 
multinationals based in different countries become more similar over time, just 
as US.-based leviathans grow less dominant and the national sources of multi- 
nationals more diffuse; (2) public policies remain important constraints and 
threats affecting multinationals’ decisions; (3) foreign investment is influenced 
importantly by  strategic considerations such as denying tactical advantage to 
oligopolistic rivals. I shall comment on each of these areas. 
That the activities of multinationals based in different countries grow more 
homogeneous is clearly correct and rests on a number of underlying trends. As 
noted by Vernon, one of these is that, among different countries’ largest firms, 80  Raymond Vernon 
institutional differences that differentially affect their potential performance 
(such as predominant family ownership) are dying out. This is true for the 
simple Darwinian reason that inefficient institutions tend not to survive forever, 
although institutional differences can coexist that do not differentially affect 
firms’ performance as foreign investors. 
A second source of reduced difference lies in increasingly similar compara- 
tive-advantage patterns, broadly  defined, of  the major industrial countries. 
With  labor-intensive manufacturing  gravitated to  the  newly  industrializing 
countries, the developed nations that are the principal homes of multinational 
firms exhibit increasingly similar patterns of comparative advantage in trade. 
This similarity is evidenced by the large increase in intraindustry trade among 
the OECD countries that has occurred since World War 11. This increased simi- 
larity in comparative-advantage  patterns translates (it can be argued) into in- 
creased similarity in nations’ patterns of foreign investment. 
A third factor, harder to pin down, is greater homogeneity of both tastes and 
technology  among the industrial countries. Homogenization is perhaps not 
quite the right word: the operative force is awareness of  differences in con- 
sumption sets and ways of doing things that translates into selective adoption 
of  foreign ways  and things, driven by  greatly reduced costs of  international 
communication and travel. For potential multinational firms, this trend lowers 
many components of  the fixed cost of  adaptation to a foreign environment. 
This trend is especially evident in the development of  Japan’s  multinational 
firms. Japanese foreign investment in the United States during the 1970s and 
1980s was driven by  its complementarity with Japanese exporting activities 
and Japan’s growing research capability, as one would expect. In the 1980s, it 
also came to be positively related to industries’ advertising intensities, as Japa- 
nese firms demonstrated the capability to steer around the national style differ- 
ences that seem to prevail in most advertising-intensive products (Drake and 
Caves 1992). 
Regarding countries’ interventions in multinationals’ activities, Vernon ar- 
gues in essence that the trend is more of  the same. Significant amounts of 
foreign investment take place, he feels, to avert profit losses caused by  the 
importing country’s restrictions on the foreign firm’s exports. Governments are 
certainly growing no less solicitous about preserving substantial (if limited and 
inexplicit) property rights of workers in their jobs. Because domestic firms’ 
property rights in their rents are much less secure, foreign investment that 
threatens only investors’ rents is viable where exports that threaten both invest- 
ors’ rents and employees’ job opportunities are not. (The glorious confusion 
surrounding this public policy preference is illustrated by  the debate in the 
United States over what is a foreign automobile.) 
Although I basically agree with Vernon’s plus p  change . . .  judgment, I 
suggest that invasive public policies have been somewhat muted by  the in- 
creased symmetry of the industrial countries’ positions as sources and hosts of 
foreign direct investment. Xenophobic reactions to foreigners, as suppliers of 81  Where Are the Multinationals Headed? 
imports, investors, owners of property, and so on, can be taken for granted. 
Those familiar with other countries’ complaints about U.S. multinationals two 
and three decades ago can only regard with bemusement the rise of exactly the 
same complaints about foreign multinationals in the United States during the 
past decade. Nonetheless, when xenophobia clamors for translation into public 
policy, the interests of multinationals based in the afflicted country demand to 
be weighed in the balance. The result, I suggest, is an important damper on 
restrictive policies analogous to the one on trade policies that Milner (1988) 
documented, which was due to increasing symmetries of trade positions. Inde- 
pendently, the developing countries have chosen less restrictive policies since 
the 1960s, part of  their more general recognition of the productivity-raising 
effects of  market-based incentive structures. That a code of  conduct toward 
multinational enterprises was even on the table for discussion in the Uruguay 
Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade testifies to the in- 
creased similarity of nations’ policy preferences; a quarter-century ago, broad 
international agreement on the treatment of multinationals would have been 
inconceivable. 
Statistical research has shown that much of the variance in the activity levels 
of multinational enterprises can be explained by  transaction cost factors that 
call for internalization within the enterprise to avert what would otherwise be 
contractual failures in arm’s-length transactions. This explanation for multina- 
tionals and their activity levels is nonstrategic in the sense that expansion 
abroad by one firm does not directly affect the payout in reduced transaction 
costs to a parallel expansion by its market rival. Vernon urges, however, that a 
large amount of foreign investment is strategic and influenced specifically by 
oligopolistic interaction of competing firms. (I am not sure how he would de- 
fine large: the criterion might be the proportion of foreign investment decisions 
ranked in some upper tier by dollar amount.) In view of the great interest that 
industrial economics has recently taken in game theory and strategic inter- 
actions, this position merits close examination. 
Vernon starts by noting the familiar evidence of the extent of international 
collusion and  market-sharing agreements in  important industries  between 
World Wars I and 11. It might be attractive for researchers to revisit this evi- 
dence in light of modern game theory, in order to characterize more precisely 
what processes were at work. The role of foreign investment in this process has 
always, to me, seemed problematic, because the division of markets involves a 
pledge to forgo investing in some nations. If the deployment of subsidiaries as 
threats or hostages was indeed involved, the evidence would make excellent 
grist for modem students of industrial organization who are oriented toward 
game theory. 
The pattern that Vernon finds prevalent, however, is the one discerned by 
Knickerbocker (1  973): parallel and imitative foreign investments by compet- 
ing firms in a U.S. oligopoly in the same host country markets and period of 
time. The mechanism seems to be the following. The oligopolists are few 82  Raymond Vernon 
enough that they can sustain a price exceeding marginal cost in any market 
where they operate, and scale economies are (implicitly) not sufficiently large 
to inflict substantial losses if  all firms invest in a given foreign market and 
period of time. A firm that does not join the investment race suffers a certain 
loss of  profits on its exports to that market (local production is assumed to 
convey a substantial marketing advantage); that firm also takes the risk that, by 
virtue of  experience in the foreign market, a rival might acquire some new 
competitive asset that could be used to improve its competitive position in the 
home market. 
This model seems coherent in identifying imitative foreign investments as a 
prisoners’ dilemma game; it conveys the interesting implications that the direct 
profits of  foreign investments could be negative and that such unprofitable 
rounds of advantage-seeking investments could continue until the oligopoly’s 
core excess profits were eliminated. Knickerbocker claimed to confirm the 
model empirically by  showing that imitative foreign investment bouts occur 
more commonly in U.S. industries that are concentrated and therefore prone 
to the recognition of oligopolistic interdependence. 
The theoretical coherence and empirical validity of this model strike me as 
issues that remain important. One reason why they deserve attention is the 
apparent prevalence in recent years of races among large international firms to 
undertake mergers that cross national borders but stay largely within a nar- 
rowly defined product or service market. Such international horizontal merg- 
ers, creating or extending multinational enterprises, seem to have occurred in 
pharmaceuticals, branded food products, major home appliances, and the en- 
tertainment (motion pictures, recordings) and publishing industries, among 
others. 
These mergers pose an interesting problem for industrial economics, be- 
cause they contain elements not fully explained either by the Knickerbocker- 
type model summarized previously or by the models of horizontal mergers that 
are standard in the literature of industrial organization. The latter models focus 
on the incentives that might exist for mergers between direct competitors in a 
homogeneous market, with the nonnourishing conclusion that the incentive is 
pervasive if  the firms are price competitors (Bertrand behavior) and almost 
nonexistent  if  they  are  quantity  competitors  (Cournot).  None  of  these 
industrial-organization models explain merger waves or races, nor do they ex- 
plain why (as apparently happens) the short-run supply strategy of the acquired 
firm or business is often left independent of the acquirer’s supply decisions. 
Khickerbocker’s model is also insufficient to explain the absence of  coordi- 
nated policies. 
I have  argued (Caves 1991) that an explanation might lie in extension of 
the theory of real options, constructed along the following lines. Consider an 
international horizontal merger in an industry whose national product markets 
are independent for purposes of  short-run price or quantity competition but 
potentially interdependent in the application of innovations, design changes, 83  Where Are the Multinationals Headed? 
or other such investment-type  forms of nonprice competition. Assume that Na- 
ture periodically reveals new opportunities for such investments; assume also 
that the speed with which a firm can seize an opportunity depends on its having 
in place an appropriate coalition of resources. Assume finally that an interna- 
tional horizontal merger extends this coalition of resources and therefore in- 
creases the number of possible opportunities that the firm can seize. The inter- 
national horizontal merger  then  becomes  analogous to  the  purchase  of  a 
portfolio of real options. 
The value of such an acquisition does not depend on any immediate rede- 
ployment of the assets of the acquired unit, so that apparently passive acquisi- 
tions can be explained. Furthermore, one firm’s improvement of its response 
capability is adverse to the expected profits of its competitor; possibly (though 
not necessarily), the competitor’s best reply is to make a similar acquisition in 
order to shrink or nullify the rival’s conditional advantage. The occurrence of 
waves of similar acquisitions can thus be explained. The normative implication 
is not that horizontal mergers point toward monopolistic restriction of output 
but that they represent strategic rent-seeking in oligopolistic markets. 
My  effort to test this model in a way  similar to Knickerbocker’s yielded 
negative results, perhaps because it was not targeted closely enough on those 
internationally concentrated industries for which the model is a priori plaus- 
ible. Nonetheless, the approach does seem useful for extending Vernon’s (and 
Knickerbocker’s) insight concerning strategic foreign investments with the the- 
ory of horizontal mergers in industries that give scope for strategic behavior. 
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Discussion Summary 
Robert Feenstra questioned Raymond Vernon’s  conclusion that the patterns of 
foreign direct investment now coming from the industrialized Asian econo- 
mies would be increasingly harmonized with the former patterns from the 
United States. He noted that the trade patterns from the Asian countries show 84  Raymond Vernon 
marked differences from those of the United States and Europe, partly in re- 
sponse to the differences in market structure of the countries. In addition, the 
market structures of the Asian countries are not explained well by the transac- 
tions cost theories developed in a U.S.  contest. On this basis, Feenstra sug- 
gested there should be some interesting differences in the patterns of  direct 
investment from the Asian and western economies, rather than harmonization. 
Donald Lessard and Kenneth Froot questioned why firms might follow each 
other in establishing production facilities in a foreign market. There was some 
agreement that this action depended on an “option value” from establishing 
overseas facilities or merging with foreign firms. Edward Graham described a 
model of this type, with two countries (A and B) and two firms (1 and 2), both 
of which are initially located only in country B. If firm 1 moves into country 
A, then firm 2 might choose to follow because it believes A has some superior 
information about market conditions there: the “option value” reflects the pos- 
sibility that demand might be especially high or costs low in that country. 
There was some discussion of the model described by Graham, with Feen- 
stra asking whether firm 2 would have entered country A in any case and Froot 
arguing that there must be  some initial distortion present for this “leader- 
follower” behavior to occur. Lael Brainard noted that there was not a good 
model of  this behavior in the industrial organization literature, but she sug- 
gested two approaches that might help. First, there has been increased attention 
recently to locational choices within a country (such as the agglomeration of 
firms), and these factors might help to explain locational choices across bor- 
ders. Second, it has been empirically established that transportation costs and 
distance are important determinants of  trade patterns, and we might expect 
them to also be determinants of foreign investment. 
In response to the last point, Peter Petri argued that “distance” can reflect 
many different factors, so we should be wary about its interpretation. Richard 
Caves suggested that cement production, a good example of  an industry in 
which transportation costs are obviously important, was  now  experiencing 
some international mergers, so a case study might be useful.  William Zeile 
noted that the latest data on foreign investment in the United States would be 
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Com- 
merce in July 1992 and would include information on the cement industry. 